A signed proof pack from minimist@1.2.5 (vendored under samples/external/).

The verifier fetches the JWS, fetches the JWK, imports the Ed25519 key using the browser's Web Crypto API, checks the signature over the JWS signing input, and then re-hashes every component file to confirm it matches the SHA-256 recorded in the signed payload.

• Violated
  No critical findings

  no-critical-findings · 2 critical findings.
• Violated
  No known CVEs in direct dependencies

  no-known-cve-in-direct-deps · Direct dependencies checked against OSV.
• OK
  No `eval` on untrusted input

  no-eval-on-untrusted-input · SEC-EVAL-001 gate.
• OK
  High-severity findings ≤ 2

  high-severity-cap · 0 high-severity findings (cap 2).
• OK
  No architectural fan-out violations

  architecture-fanout · ARCH-FANOUT-001 gate.

• criticalsupply-chainSC-CVE-MINIMIST-001

  Package `minimist@1.2.5` is affected by CVE-2021-44906 (prototype pollution)

  package.json:3

  confidence 100%
  "version": "1.2.5"

  Why: Version 1.2.5 predates the fix for CVE-2021-44906. The vulnerability is prototype pollution via a `constructor` key in the parsed arguments; the fix in 1.2.6 added a `constructor` guard to `setKey`. NVD score: 9.8 (critical).

  Detector: svp-dependency + OSV feed (GHSA-xvch-5gv4-984h)

  Reachable from

  • → import minimist → parse(args) → setKey(argv, keys, value)
  Recommendation: Upgrade to `minimist ^1.2.6` (patch-only upgrade, no API break).
• criticalsecuritySEC-PROTO-POLLUTION-001

  `setKey` guards `__proto__` but not `constructor` — prototype pollution sink

  index.js:69 · setKey

  confidence 95%
  if (key === '__proto__') return;

  Why: The `setKey` helper walks a user-controlled key path and assigns into the target object. Lines 73 and 82 guard the exact string `__proto__` — but not `constructor`, `prototype`, or `constructor.prototype`. An attacker who controls CLI arguments (or JSON parsed by minimist) can pollute Object.prototype through a `constructor.prototype` payload. This is the code-level root cause of the CVE in the previous finding.

  Detector: svp-verification (semantic check on argument-parser sinks)

  Reachable from

  • → parse(argv, opts) → argDefined() → setKey(argv, keys, value)
  • → parse(argv, opts) → defaults[key] fallback → setKey(argv, x.split('.'), defaults[key])
  Recommendation: Add `if (key === 'constructor' || key === 'prototype') return;` to setKey before the existing __proto__ check — or replace the guard set with a full disallow-list including all Object.prototype accessor names.
• mediumqualityQUAL-LONG-001

  File `index.js` is 246 lines — above the 200-line soft threshold

  index.js:1

  confidence 100%
  module.exports = function (args, opts) { ... }

  Why: index.js consolidates the entire parser plus 6 internal helpers in one file. Not a blocker on its own, but a smaller surface would make future audits cheaper.

  Detector: svp-parser (structural metric)

  Recommendation: Consider extracting `setKey` and the flag-classifier helpers into siblings.
• infosupply-chainMETA-LICENSE-MIT

  License = MIT (permissive, redistribution allowed)

  LICENSE:1

  confidence 100%
  This software is released under the MIT license

  Why: Vendored copy carries an MIT LICENSE file. Attribution preserved per the license terms in the manifest provenance block.

  Detector: svp-dependency (license fingerprint)

  Recommendation: No action — informational.

Or use any JOSE library: Python joserfc, Node jose, Go github.com/go-jose/go-jose. Look up the key id softinel-evidence-2026-07 in the JWKS.